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Abstract 
Two studies were conducted to investigate the relation between individual differences in Social 
Dominance Orientation (SDO) and moral inclinations when responding to situations of moral 
conflict. In Study 1 the correlation between scores on SDO and deontological and utilitarian 
parameters was investigated. The results showed that SDO was significantly negatively related to 
deontological parameters, (r(49) = -.354, p = .013), and unrelated to utilitarian parameters (r(49) 
= -.104, p = .479). In Study 2 we attempted to replicate the results of Study 1 and investigate 
whether increasing the salience of harm in dilemmas would increase levels of deontological 
processing, particularly in individuals with lower levels of SDO. The results of Study 2 were 
mixed. The results of Study 1 were replicated, with scores on SDO being negatively related to 
the deontological parameter r(143) = -.173, p = .039, and unrelated to the utilitarian parameter, 
r(143) = -.035, p = .682, but increasing the salience of harm did not differentially affect 
deontological responses in participants, β = -.191, p = .365.	  The results of these studies extended 
the literature on both SDO and moral decision-making, and have implications for who may be 
best suited for making difficult decisions in the real world.  
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The Relation of SDO to Moral Decision-Making Using a Process Dissociation Approach 
Researchers have discovered that group-based hierarchies exist in essentially every 
human society (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). The existence of group-based 
hierarchies signficantly impacts how individuals within a society are treated. Due to differences 
in group status within a hierarchy, individuals in subordinate groups may have less access to 
resources and opportunities, and may even face limited access or no access to certain rights. Due 
to the implications of these hierarchies for the welfare of certain groups, it is important to study 
the factors that serve to maintain and legitimize this type of social structure. 
The current research investigated the degree to which individuals endorse or prefer 
differences in equality between groups, and a potential mechanism that may drive this 
preference. Evidence suggests that this particular attitude contributes to the maintenance of 
hierarchies, and increases discrimination towards individuals of different group standings. As 
such, it is an important variable that deserves the attention of researchers. The current research 
also served to bridge the gap between the literature on attitudes towards group hierarchies and 
the literature on moral decision-making by investigating whether moral inclinations vary 
systemically between individuals as a function of their level of support for group based 
hierarchies. By bridging this gap in the literature, the current research will extend two lines of 
research, provide new interpretations for findings in each area, and further elucidate the 
influence of individual difference variables on the maintenance of hierarchical social structures. 
Social Dominance Orientation 
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) is an individual difference variable that measures 
the degree to which a person prefers group-based hierarchies in society (Pratto, Sidanius, 
Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). If an individual is high in SDO, this suggests that they prefer 
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inequality between social groups, whereas an individual low in SDO should prefer groups to be 
equal. SDO was first introduced as a component of Social Dominance Theory (SDT), which 
sought to explain the observation that social groups are organized into hierarchies in every 
studied human culture (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). A group-based hierarchy 
describes a social system that consists of at least one dominant group and one subordinate group. 
The researchers proposed a systematic process by which these hierarchies might be created and 
maintained. They specified a number of factors and influences that are hypothesized to cause 
discrimination and prejudice at three levels: the level of the individual, the level of the group, 
and the level of society (Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006). 
Various factors are proposed to contribute to discrimination at each level of the SDT 
model. At the level of the system, it is proposed that cultures and the individuals in them 
prescribe to widely accepted and shared ideologies that serve to either enhance or attenuate 
hierarchies (Pratto et al., 2006). Hierarchy-enhancing ideologies prescribe behaviours that 
maintain group inequality, whereas hierarchy-attenuating ideologies prescribe behaviours that 
reduce inequality (Pratto, Tatar, & Conway-Lanz, 1999). Examples of hierarchy-enhancing 
ideologies include notions of fate, beliefs in a just world, or internal attributions of poverty, all of 
which serve to justify inequality. Examples of hierarchy-attenuating ideologies include social 
democracy, egalitarianism, and human rights, all which serve to mitigate the dominance of 
certain groups, while reducing the subordinance of others. As these ideologies are proposed to 
exist at the system-wide level, they are theorized to influence the actions of social institutions. 
Institutions are assumed to have a significant influence on the positioning of groups, as 
institutions have access to a vast number of social resources and control their allocation. 
Therefore, institutions can directly influence the status of social groups through the allocation of 
SDO AND MORALITY  Dryburgh 6 	  
resources. At the level of groups, social context is believed to influence the presence of 
discrimination, as does asymmetrical group behaviour (Pratto et al., 1994). Asymmetrical group 
behaviour can occur when members of subordinate groups (some of whom may have high levels 
of SDO), contribute to their own low status through actions such as supporting the dominant 
group (Pratto et al., 1999). At the level of the individual, both aggregated individual 
discrimination, SDO, and additional group orientations are proposed to contribute to group 
hierarchies. The person level, and specifically SDO, will be the main focus of the current 
research.  
 SDO has been extensively researched and correlates with a number of important 
variables. In Western countries, SDO has been shown to correlate positively with measures of 
sexism, racism, nationalism, conservatism, cultural elitism, support for the military and attitudes 
towards wars of dominance (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius, Pratto, & Mitchell, 1994). In contrast, 
SDO has been shown to correlate negatively with measures of support for gay rights and 
women’s rights, social welfare programs, environmental policy, altruism, noblesse oblige, and 
ameliorative racial policy (Pratto et al., 1994). Therefore, the majority of SDO’s correlates relate 
directly to the enhancement or reduction of inequality between groups. In addition, the broad 
range of groups represented in these variables demonstrates that SDO is a general attitudinal 
dimension towards social groups of differing group status, as opposed to a specific attitude 
towards particular groups.  
 Not only have these correlates been established in Western countries, but researchers 
have also found evidence that SDO predicts attitudes towards group inequality across a number 
of different cultures. For example, Pratto et al. (2000) found that SDO was positively correlated 
with measures of sexism in all of the surveyed cultures, and prejudice against local denigrated 
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ethnic groups, conservatism, and punitive action in most of the cultures (Pratto et al., 2000). 
These results support the idea that, regardless of the specific groups that are targeted or 
ideologies that are endorsed in a culture, SDO serves as a reliable measure of attitudes towards 
group-based hierarchies.  
 SDO has been criticized for its similarity to other individual-difference variables. For 
example, some have suggested that SDO is redundant with Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; 
Altemeyer, 1981). Despite the intention of both constructs to provide an explanation for 
prejudice and discrimination, the variables have been shown to differ both theoretically and 
empirically. Theoretically, RWA is conceptualized as a pathological state of a mind consisting of 
ego-defensive mechanisms, while SDO is conceived of as reflecting normal human variation 
(Sidanius, Pratto, Laar, & Levin, 2004). In addition, RWA involves one’s relation to his or her 
in-group, while SDO involves general attitudinal variation towards hierarchies between groups, 
independent of one’s own in-group status. Empirically, both variables have been shown to 
reliably predict prejudice against other groups, but each variable makes independent 
contributions to the prediction (Sidanius et al., 2004; Duckitt, 2003; Jackson & Esses, 2000). 
Henry, Sidanius, Levin, and Pratto (2005) demonstrated the discriminant validity of SDO and 
RWA by measuring attitudes towards terror and intergroup violence in students from the U.S. 
and Lebanon. The results showed that for U.S. students both RWA and SDO predicted higher 
levels of support for fighting Middle Eastern terrorists, as fighting terrorists both asserts the 
power of their in-group and maintains the dominant position of America. In contrast, for students 
in Lebanon higher levels of RWA predicted higher levels of support for violence against the U.S, 
while SDO was negatively predictive of this support. As SDO is independent of group 
membership, and those high in SDO support the maintenance of group-based hierarchies, 
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Lebanese students that were high in SDO were opposed to violence against the U.S., because it 
would represent a lack of support for the dominant group. Therefore, they were more supportive 
of actions that would maintain the current dominance structure rather than upset it. These results 
are consistent with the predictions of SDT that subordinate group members sometimes contribute 
actively to their own lower status. Although similar in a number of ways, RWA and SDO are 
separate and independent variables that provide unique contributions to the study of 
discrimination. In addition to its distinction from RWA, SDO has also been shown to be 
empirically distinct from the variables of interpersonal dominance, conservatism, and each of the 
Big Five personality traits (Pratto et al., 1994). 
SDO and Fairness 
 Researchers have proposed that SDO may influence the use of fairness in decision-
making (Armstrong, 2013; Pratto et al., 1999). According to Social Dominance Theory, group-
based social hierarchies are consistently observed in all human cultures. Therefore, individuals 
high in SDO should believe in allocating resources in a way that maintains inequality between 
groups (Pratto et al., 1994). Furthermore, an individual’s level of SDO should influence how 
they choose to allocate resources to different groups. SDO’s correlates, such as its negative 
relation to Social Welfare Programs and negative attitudes towards disadvantaged groups (Pratto 
et al., 1994), suggest that SDO does relate to how people choose to distribute resources. 
 Pratto, Stallworth, Sidanius and Siers (1997) provided indirect evidence for the prediction 
that SDO influences the allocation of resources in a manner that serves to strengthen and 
maintain hierarchy. Across four separate studies, the researchers provided evidence that 
participants both selected and were selected for occupations that were congruent with their level 
of SDO. High SDO participants chose and were chosen for jobs that channeled resources to high 
SDO AND MORALITY  Dryburgh 9 	  
status groups, such as a fundraising job that served an elite university (Pratto, Stallworth, 
Sidanius, & Siers, 1997). Low SDO participants selected and were selected for jobs that tended 
to channel resources towards low status groups, such as a fundraising job for African American 
college students in need (Pratto et al., 1997). Therefore, the researchers concluded that SDO 
influences the way that individuals select career paths, and contributes to hiring biases. They 
proposed that these biases serve to match the values of an individual to the institution in which 
they would work. In this way, SDO indirectly influences the way in which resources are 
allocated. In addition, these findings explain how differences at the individual level contribute to 
hierarchy maintenance at the level of the institution. 
  Pratto, Tatar, and Conway-Lanz (1999) sought direct evidence for the idea that SDO is 
related to the differential allocation of resources in a way that serves to strengthen and maintain 
hierarchy, and did so by asking participants to choose how to distribute positive resources. 
Participants were given a choice to provide a resource of positive social value to a party that had 
either demonstrated merit or demonstrated need. Those who were higher in levels of SDO chose 
the meritorious, or more deserving, party over the needy party. Meanwhile, participants lower in 
SDO favoured the needy party over the party that demonstrated merit. The researchers therefore 
concluded that people with varying levels of SDO endorsed different ideologies that led them to 
allocate resources in attitude consistent ways (Pratto et al., 1999). Unfortunately, this study 
confounded the variables of merit and need with target status, such that meritorious parties were 
always of higher status and needy parties were always of lower status (Armstrong, 2013). 
Therefore, while providing direct evidence that high and low SDO individuals distribute 
resources differentially, further research was required in order to determine the mechanism by 
which this occurs. 
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 Armstrong (2013) conducted a study designed to address this confound. The researcher 
provided participants with patient files (that had been constructed for the purposes of this study) 
of either a low status or high status individual. Participants were informed that these patients 
were in need of an organ and were asked to assign each patient a wait list priority rating. The 
results showed that participants higher in SDO gave more favourable ratings to high status 
individuals, while participants lower in SDO gave more favourable ratings to low status 
individuals (Armstrong, 2013). As the ratings were almost all higher than dictated by the 
distribution guidelines provided, a more favourable rating towards a certain group represented a 
less fair rating. These results provided evidence that individuals with varying levels of SDO 
distributed resources in violation of prescribed fairness rules, in order to maintain or attenuate 
inequality in a manner congruent with their levels of SDO. In a second study, the organ 
allocations were negatively framed, as participants were told that the patients had previously 
received a high rating that now had to be lowered because of shortfalls in projected organ 
availability. The low SDO individuals demonstrated the same pattern of responses as in the first 
study, providing more favourable ratings to the low status targets than the high status targets. In 
contrast, instead of high SDO individuals simply giving preference to high status targets, they 
gave equal ratings to targets of different status, demonstrating greater adherence to the guidelines 
of fairness in these judgments. This research suggests that individuals who support group-based 
hierarchies may be better suited to make difficult decisions involving fairness. In addition, it 
raises questions about the mechanism driving the differences in these decisions. 
 The first possible mechanism that Armstrong (2013) proposed for this differential use of 
fairness was empathy. Researchers have suggested that since individuals who display high levels 
of empathy for others tend to be less prejudiced towards others, those that have high levels of 
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SDO could be expected to display less empathy (Pratto et al., 1999; Sidanius et al., 1994). 
Research has supported this notion, as a negative correlation was found between SDO and scores 
on the Concern for Others subscale of Davis’ (1983) Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Pratto et al., 
1994). Similarly, Sidanius and Pratto (1999) demonstrated that individuals with higher levels of 
SDO showed less concern for the well-being of others. Duckitt (2001) even went so far as to 
propose that a lack of empathy might be partially responsible for the development of higher 
levels of SDO. Therefore, the research suggests that there is a relation between levels of empathy 
and levels of SDO. Armstrong (2013) measured trait empathy in a post-decisional questionnaire 
and, despite a relation between SDO and empathy, found no evidence that it influenced fairness 
ratings. Therefore, the evidence suggests that empathy did not drive the relation between SDO 
and applications of fairness rules. Armstrong (2013) proposed a second potential mechanism 
behind the relation of SDO to these decisions. He posited that differences in moral inclinations 
between high and low SDO individuals might account for their differential treatment of high and 
low status groups.  
Moral Inclinations 
 Moral dilemmas, in which participants are asked to choose between one of two outcomes, 
has been the dominant paradigm used to study moral judgments for many years (e.g. Bartels, 
2008; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Petrinovich & O’Neill, 1996). One 
commonly used dilemma is called the trolley dilemma. In the trolley dilemma, participants are 
told that a trolley is headed down a track towards a group of five individuals. They can choose to 
either let the trolley continue on its course and allow it to kill five people, or they can pull a 
nearby lever, which will re-direct the trolley to a different path and kill one person instead of five 
(Foot, 1967). There are two approaches to take when answering this moral dilemma. Utilitarian 
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processing is based on the idea that the morality of an action depends on its consequences (Mill, 
1861/1998). Meanwhile, deontological processing is rooted in the idea that whether an action is 
moral is an intrinsic quality of the action (Kant, 1785/1959). Psychologically, utilitarian 
processing involves a cognitive evaluation of outcomes (a cost-benefits analysis), while 
deontological processing is related to an affective aversion to harm (Conway & Gawronski, 
2013). Therefore, in the trolley dilemma, the utilitarian choice would be to re-direct the trolley to 
hit a single person, and the deontological choice would be to avoid switching the lever and let it 
continue to hit five people. Historically, researchers presented participants with multiple 
scenarios similar to the trolley dilemma, measured their tendency to respond in a utilitarian or 
deontological fashion, and placed them somewhere on a unidimensional scale with deontological 
processing at one end and utilitarian processing at the other. Therefore, the deontological-
utilitarian variable was conceptualized as a single, continuous dimension with each of these 
processes at opposite ends. 
 While the traditional approach to measuring moral inclinations contributed a number of 
interesting findings to the field, it also required problematic interpretations of data. One of the 
strangest of these empirical findings found that psychopathy is related to higher levels of 
utilitarian judgment (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011). As many theorists make the argument that 
utilitarian judgments are the most morally appropriate approach to decision-making (Baron & 
Spranca, 1997; Bennis, Medin, & Bartels, 2010; Bazerman, & Greene, 2010), researchers were 
surprised to find that psychopaths were demonstrating high levels of this prototypical moral 
behaviour. This posed a problem for theorists and researchers in regards to how these processes 
should be conceptualized. 
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 Further evidence supported the idea that a new conceptualization of these processes was 
necessary. Greene (2007) demonstrated that when participants were considering moral dilemmas 
in which they were in direct contact or emotionally close with the victim, and when they made 
more deontological judgments, there were higher levels of activation in areas of the brain related 
to emotion. In addition, this research found that for dilemmas in which the participant was 
emotionally distant from the target, or when they made more utilitarian judgments, areas of the 
brain associated with cognitive processing were highly active (Greene, 2007). This research 
suggested that there might be two independent processes that are underlying these types of moral 
processing. Furthermore, Tanner, Medin, and Iliev (2008) completed a study in which they had 
participants complete a questionnaire with statements related to deontological and utilitarian 
principles. They asked participants to rate their agreement with each statement, and examined the 
correlation between responses. The results showed the participants’ answers to the principles 
were uncorrelated. If the two types of processing were truly reflective of a continuous, unipolar 
dimension, then one would expect a negative correlation in regards to agreement with these 
principles. The lack of evidence supporting a negative relation between deontological and 
utilitarian principles suggests that placing them on a unipolar dimension does not accurately 
represent the underlying mechanisms. 
 Conway & Gawronski (2013) recently proposed a new approach that resolves a number 
of these empirical and conceptual issues. The researchers proposed the use of a Process 
Dissociation Approach (PD; Jacoby, 1991) in measuring these moral inclinations. Jacoby (1991) 
created the PD approach in order to tease apart the independent contributions of recognition and 
recollection to memory. By taking this approach and applying it to moral dilemmas, Conway and 
Gawronski (2013) identified a way to look at utilitarian and deontological inclinations separately 
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within an individual. The specific procedure of the PD approach involves presenting participants 
with both “congruent” and “incongruent” moral dilemmas. Congruent dilemmas are situations 
where both moral inclinations should lead to the same outcome judgment. For example, 
participants should judge torturing a man in order to find out the location of a paint bomb as an 
inappropriate action, regardless of any differences in underlying moral processing (Conway & 
Gawronski, 2013). In contrast, asking participants if it is appropriate to torture a man in order to 
find the location of a real bomb and save the lives of many others should lead to different 
responses depending on the strength of the moral inclinations (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). In 
this situation, higher utilitarian inclinations should lead one to judge that this action is moral, as 
it will save more lives overall, and higher deontological inclinations should lead one to judge this 
action as immoral, as the act of torture itself is aversive. Using this technique, the relative 
strength of each inclination can be algebraically determined within an individual. Therefore an 
individual can now be high in both deontological and utilitarian inclinations, low in both 
inclinations, or demonstrate some combination of the inclinations. 
 Conway and Gawronski (2013) provided evidence for the convergent and divergent 
validity of their new approach to quantifying these variables, by demonstrating that utilitarian 
inclinations were correlated with measures of Need for Cognition, and deontological inclinations 
were correlated with measures of Empathy and Perspective-Taking (Conway & Gawronski, 
2013). Furthermore, manipulations of cognitive load uniquely affected utilitarian inclinations, 
and manipulations of emotional impact uniquely affected deontological inclinations. Therefore, 
Conway and Gawronski (2013) provided experimental evidence that there are two separate 
underlying psychological processes that lead to either utilitarian or deontological decisions.  
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Another interesting finding provided further evidence for the usefulness of the PD 
approach to moral inclinations by resolving the previously described results regarding 
psychopaths. When tested using the PD approach, psychopathy was not positively related to 
utilitarian judgments, as the traditional approach would suggest. Instead, psychopathy was 
negatively related to deontological inclinations (Conway, Bartels, & Pizarro, in submission). 
Therefore this new approach to the study of moral inclinations has resolved a number of 
empirical and conceptual issues, and has offered a new and interesting perspective on the 
processes that underlie moral decisions.  
The Current Research 
 The current research will attempt to bridge the gap between these two developing areas of 
research. In particular, the overall goal of this research will be to determine if a relation exists 
between an individual’s level of SDO and each of the moral inclinations. In addition, an attempt 
will be made to determine whether increasing the salience of harm of responses to moral 
dilemmas will differentially affect the responses of individuals of varying levels of SDO.  
 If the results support a relation between SDO and moral decision-making, then they will 
have a number of important implications. First of all, the results will shed light on the factors that 
affect an individual’s response in a situation of moral conflict, by demonstrating that certain 
people are more influenced by emotional processes in these decisions than others. If a 
manipulation of the salience of harm to a target is successful in altering participants’ responses to 
moral decisions, then support will be given to the idea that attempts to induce empathy to change 
people’s responses will be particularly effective for a subset of people. Furthermore, the results 
will allow us to understand the factors that make certain people better suited to making difficult 
decisions – including those that involve life or death. Therefore, this research will contribute to 
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the growing literature on SDO, fairness, and morality, while providing real-life implications for 
decision-making in the real world.  
There are a number of predictions that will be tested in the current studies. The primary 
hypothesis is that SDO will be negatively related to deontological inclinations and unrelated to 
utilitarian inclinations. Therefore, those higher on SDO should show a decreased level of this 
affective aversion to harm when faced with moral dilemmas as compared to those lower on SDO, 
without showing differences in processing related to the cognitive evaluation of outcomes. This 
is the primary hypothesis of this program of research, and will be tested in both Study 1 and 
Study 2. 
 In Study 2 an experimental manipulation will be employed in an attempt to influence 
individuals’ decisions on moral dilemmas. The main hypothesis for this study is that an 
interaction will occur such that increasing the salience of harm to the target will increase 
deontological inclinations, but to a greater degree for lower SDO individuals than those higher in 
SDO. The second hypothesis is that increasing the salience of harm to the target will have no 
effect on utilitarian inclinations. The third hypothesis is that the results of Study 1 will be 
replicated, such that SDO will be negatively related to deontological inclinations and unrelated to 
utilitarian inclinations.  
Study 1 
 The current study was conducted to investigate whether a relation exists between SDO 
and moral inclinations. It was predicted that scores on SDO would be negatively related to scores 
on the deontology parameter, and unrelated to scores on the utilitarian parameter. 
Method 
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Participants. The participants of the current study included 49 undergraduate students 
recruited from a first-year psychology course participation pool. Participants received credit in 
partial fulfillment of course requirements for their participation. The sample consisted of 32 
females and 17 males, ranging from 17 years to 23 years (M = 18, SD = .91). Participants were 
tested on individual computers in groups of up to five people. One participant failed to complete 
a number of questions and was therefore excluded from the final analyses. 
Procedure. Participants were given a Letter of Information outlining the purpose and 
tasks involved in the study, and informed consent was obtained. Participants were sat at a 
computer terminal where they completed the scales in the following order: demographic 
information, the battery of moral dilemmas, the Social Dominance Orientation-6 (SDO-6) Scale 
and the Global Belief in a Just World (GBJW) Scale. Participants were then fully debriefed and 
given credit for their participation. The entire procedure took less than 30 minutes to complete. 
Materials. 
 Demographics Questionnaire. Participants were asked to provide information regarding 
their gender, age, and estimated household income. 
 Moral Dilemmas. Moral inclinations were measured using the moral dilemmas provided 
by Conway and Gawronski (2013). Participants were asked to carefully read and respond to the 
battery of 20 dilemmas, composed of an incongruent and congruent version of 10 different 
dilemmas. Each participant was asked to respond with whether they thought that the proposed 
action was appropriate or not appropriate. For example, participants were asked whether 
torturing a man to find the location of an explosive bomb was appropriate (incongruent version) 
and then later asked whether torturing a man to find the location of a paint bomb was appropriate 
(congruent version). As discussed, in the congruent version participants should give the same 
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response regardless of the relative strength of moral inclinations they rely on. In the incongruent 
version, responses should differ based on whether the participant is relying on deontological 
inclinations or utilitarian inclinations to a greater extent. 
Social Dominance Orientation. SDO was measured using the SDO-6 Scale (Pratto et al., 
2006), consisting of 16 items. Participants were asked to rate their agreement with each item, 
ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). The items included statements such as 
“Some groups of people are simply not the equals of others” and “Superior groups should 
dominate inferior groups.” The scale has been shown to have both good internal reliability (α = 
.83) and test-retest reliability (r = .81, p < .01; Pratto et al., 2006). In our sample, the SDO-6 
scale demonstrated high internal reliability (α = .93). 
Belief in a Just World. The last measure completed by participants was the GBJW Scale 
(Lipkus, 1991), consisting of 16 items. Participants were asked to rate their agreement with each 
item on a scale from strongly disagree (-3) to strongly agree (3). Examples of the items include 
“I feel that people get what they are entitled to have” and “I basically feel that the world is a fair 
place.” The scale has been shown to have acceptable internal reliability (α = .83;  Lipkus, 1991). 
In our sample, the GBJW scale demonstrated acceptable internal reliability (α = .63). 
Results 
 The current study was designed to determine whether participants’ scores on the SDO-6 
Scale were correlated with scores on the deontology and utilitarian parameters. We hypothesized 
that SDO scores would be significantly negatively correlated with scores on the deontology 
parameter, and would not be correlated with scores on the utilitarian parameter. 
 Process Dissociation (PD) scores of the deontology and utilitarian parameters were 
calculated using the algebraic formulas given by Conway and Gawronski (2013). A total of two 
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participants with a utilitarian parameter score of zero were excluded from the analysis, as per 
Conway and Gawronski’s (2013) method, as these scores act as a denominator. As such, a score 
of zero makes it impossible to complete the necessary calculations. The deontological and 
utilitarian scores were then standardized and these scores were used in the rest of the analysis. 
 A bivariate correlation was performed to determine the relation between SDO and the 
moral parameters. The relation between SDO scores and the deontology parameter was 
significant, r(49)= -.354, p = .013. This indicates that scores on SDO are negatively related to 
scores on the deontology parameter. The correlation between SDO scores and the utilitarian 
parameter was not significant, r(49) = -.104, p = .479. Therefore there was no relation found 
between SDO scores and scores on the utilitarian parameter. The results of the current study 
supported both of our hypotheses; SDO scores were negatively related to deontological scores 
and unrelated to utilitarian scores.  
In order to assess group differences in SDO scores, a median split analysis was 
performed. The difference between the high SDO group (M = 1.84, SD = .49) and the low SDO 
group (M = 3.89, SD = .62) was significant, t(47) = -12.92, p < .001. Therefore, the scores of 
high SDO and low SDO participants differed significantly, despite the fact that SDO scores were 
not high in an absolute sense.  
 As previous research suggests that SDO is positively related to BJW and household 
income (Pratto et al., 1994), and is higher in males than females (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanious, 
Pratto, & Bobo, 1994), we tested the relation between SDO scores and these variables. The 
results of the correlational analysis are displayed in Table 1. The expected relations between 
SDO, BJW, and household income were not found. An independent samples t-test was 
performed, and the difference between genders on SDO was also not significant, t(47) = 1.822, p 
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= .075. In addition, deontological scores did not significantly differ between males (M = -.26, SD 
= 1.02) and females (M = .14, SD = .98), t(47) = -1.331, p = .190. The utilitarian scores of males 
(M = -.02, SD = .90) and females (M = .01, SD = 1.06) also did not differ significantly, t(47) = -
.087, p = .931. These results may suggest that more power is needed to find these relations by 
way of a larger sample size. 
Discussion 
 The results from Study 1 provide support for our hypotheses, derived from Armstrong’s 
(2013) study. Using the PD approach, it was found that those higher in SDO have lower levels of 
deontological processing than those lower in SDO when responding to moral dilemmas. It was 
also found that levels of utilitarian processing did not differ as a function of SDO. According to 
the model of moral processing introduced by Conway and Gawronski (2013), these results 
demonstrate that lower levels of SDO are associated with more affective reactions to harm in 
moral decisions when compared to lower levels of SDO. Meanwhile, cognitive deliberation 
about costs and benefits in moral decisions is consistent across levels of SDO.  
Study 2 
 The current study investigated whether responses on moral dilemmas by individuals that 
differ on SDO would be differentially influenced by an experimental manipulation. Increasing 
the salience of harm to the target has previously been demonstrated to increase deontological 
inclinations (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). We hypothesized that a salience of harm 
manipulation would increase deontological responding to a greater degree for lower SDO 
individuals than higher SDO individuals. Increasing the salience of harm was predicted to have 
no effect on utilitarian inclinations. Lastly, we predicted that the results from Study 1 would be 
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replicated, such that SDO would be negatively related to deontological inclinations and unrelated 
to utilitarian inclinations. 
Method 
Participants. The second study included 143 participants recruited from the online 
survey website Mechanical Turk. A total of 25 from the original sample were excluded, 13 
because they had a utilitarian score of zero (which poses problems for the algebraic formulas 
used, as described above), one because of a failure to answer the attention check correctly, and 
11 that did not complete the full set of questions required for analysis. The sample consisted of 
84 females and 59 males, ranging from 18 to 72 years old (M = 35.39, SD = 11.76). Participants 
were able to read a short description of the study before signing up to participate, and were 
compensated financially ($0.25) for their time. All of the tasks were completed individually on 
the participant’s own computer. 
Procedure. Participants were asked to read the Letter of Information and provide 
informed consent. All tasks were completed online, beginning with the Demographics 
Questionnaire, followed by the battery of Moral Dilemmas, the SDO-6 Scale, and the GBJW 
Scale. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, a high salience of harm 
condition and a low salience of harm condition. In the high salience of harm condition, an 
empathy-inducing picture of the apparent target accompanied the moral dilemmas. In the low 
salience of harm condition, there was no picture accompanying the dilemmas. The entire 
procedure took less than 30 minutes to complete. 
Materials. The Demographics Questionnaire, SDO-6 Scale, and GBJW Scale were 
identical to the materials used in Study 1. The SDO-6 Scale again showed high internal 
reliability (α = .93), as did the GBJW scale (α = .88). 
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The difference between this study and the first was the salience of harm manipulation. 
For this condition, each moral dilemma was presented with a picture of the apparent victim (e.g. 
the man that will be tortured to find the location of the bomb). The pictures and procedure were 
identical to that of Conway and Gawronski (2013). Pictures of the victim were presented 
alongside the dilemma in order to induce empathy in participations, or to increase the salience of 
harm in the situation.  
Results 
 The current study investigated whether manipulating the salience of harm in moral 
dilemmas would differentially affect the moral inclination scores of low and high SDO 
individuals. We hypothesized that an increase in the salience of harm would increase 
deontological inclinations, but to a greater extent in lower SDO participants than in higher SDO 
participants. Additionally, we hypothesized that the increase in salience of harm would have no 
effect on utilitarian inclinations. It was also hypothesized that the results of Study 1 would be 
replicated, and SDO scores would be negatively related to the deontology parameter, but 
unrelated to the utilitarian parameter. 
 The PD approach (Conway & Gawronski, 2013) was again used to calculate scores on 
the deontology and utilitarian parameters, which were then standardized and used in further 
analyses. The primary hypothesis was tested using a multiple regression analysis, in which the 
deontology parameter was regressed on the salience of harm, mean SDO scores, and the 
interaction of the salience of harm and SDO scores. As displayed in Figure 1, the analysis did not 
reveal a significant interaction between the salience of harm and SDO on deontology scores (β = 
.113, p = .586). Therefore, the prediction that salience of harm and SDO would interact to predict 
change in the deontological parameter was not supported.  
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Further analyses were performed as a manipulation check, to assess whether the salience 
of harm manipulation increased scores on the deontology parameter in the experimental 
condition compared to the control condition. An independent samples t-test was used to test the 
influence of the salience of harm manipulation. Levene’s test of homogeneity of variances was 
not significant, so variances were assumed to be equal, Levene F(1, 141) = 1.697, p = .121. The 
results showed that there was not a significant difference in scores on the deontology parameter 
between the salience of harm condition (M = .12, SD = 1.05) and the control condition (M = 
0.14, SD = .92), t(141) = -1.560, p = .121. Therefore, the deontology parameter scores showed no 
evidence of being affected by the salience of harm manipulation. 
We tested our second hypothesis, that increasing the salience of harm would have no 
effect on utilitarian parameter scores, using a multiple regression analysis in which the utilitarian 
parameter was regressed on the salience of harm, mean SDO scores, and the interaction of the 
salience of harm and SDO scores. The analysis did not reveal a significant interaction between 
the salience of harm and SDO on utilitarian scores, β = -.191, p = .365. An independent samples 
t-test revealed that the utilitarian scores of those in the control condition (M = .11, SD = .96), and 
the salience of harm condition (M = -.10, SD = 1.03), did not differ significantly, t(141) = 1.233, 
p = .220. These results are consistent with previous research that demonstrates utilitarian scores 
are unaffected by an empathy-inducing manipulation (Conway & Gawronski, 2013).  
 Our third hypothesis was that the negative relation between SDO and deontological 
inclinations found in Study 1 would be replicated, and was tested using a bivariate correlation. 
The results showed that SDO scores were significantly and negatively correlated with scores on 
the deontology parameter, r(143) = -.173, p = .039, and were unrelated to scores on the utilitarian 
parameter, r(143) = -.035, p = .682. Therefore the third hypothesis was supported, and the results 
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of Study 1 replicated. This finding was supported by the results of the multiple regression 
analysis, as SDO scores were still a significant predictor of deontology scores after taking into 
account the variance due to the interaction, β = -.182, p = .030.  
 Additionally, in the current study, we found several of the expected correlations 
suggested by previous research that were absent in Study 1. As seen in Table 2, BJW was 
significantly positively correlated with SDO. Although household income was not related to 
SDO, it was significantly positively correlated with both BJW and the utilitarian parameter. 
Therefore, individuals with higher levels of household income are higher in just-world beliefs 
and demonstrate more utilitarian processing. In addition, when performing an independent t-test, 
males (M = 2.62, SD = 1.11) had significantly higher scores than females (M = 2.20, SD = 0.97), 
on the measure of SDO, t(141) = 2.439, p = .016.  When testing for differences on moral 
inclinations, females (M = .26, SD = .90) had significantly higher scores than males (M = -.37, 
SD = 1.02), on the deontology parameter, t(141) = -3.868, p < .001. In terms of utilitarian scores, 
females (M = -.05, SD = 1.03) and males (M = .07, SD = .96) did not differ significantly, t(141) = 
.668, p = .505. These results are consistent with past findings in the literature on SDO and the 
literature on moral dilemmas.  
Discussion 
Results from Study 2 were mixed. Our hypothesis that manipulating the salience of harm 
would differentially affect the deontological inclinations of low and high SDO individuals was 
not supported. As the manipulation of the salience of harm did not have a main effect on 
deontological inclinations, the presence of an interaction cannot be determined. Further research 
will need to effectively influence deontological inclinations such that they are higher in the 
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experimental condition, and then further delineate the effects on the responses of low and high 
SDO individuals. 
The results of Study 2, however, did support our primary hypothesis, that preferences for 
group-based hierarchies are related to differences in deontological inclinations and unrelated to 
differences in utilitarian inclinations. Therefore, the overall hypothesis suggested by Armstrong 
(2013) was supported, such that individuals higher in SDO show lower levels of deontological 
processing than those lower in SDO, though they do not differ in utilitarian processing.  
General Discussion 
 The two studies discussed here provide support for the hypothesis that individuals who 
prefer group-based hierarchies demonstrate lower levels of deontological inclinations when faced 
with moral dilemmas than those that prefer equality between groups. In addition, there was no 
evidence found to indicate that levels of utilitarian inclinations differ between those that prefer 
inequality or those that prefer equality. Therefore, when making a moral decision, people who 
prefer inequality between groups are less inclined to rely on an affective aversion to harm than 
those that prefer equality.  
 The results of the current research provide a plausible mechanism by which to interpret 
the different decisions made by those in Armstrong’s (2013) study. It is possible that people who 
preferred equality between groups relied more on an affective aversion to harm when making 
resource allocation decisions than those who preferred inequality. By relying less on an affective 
aversion to harm, people that preferred inequalities between groups were able to make a decision 
regarding a resource allocation that adhered more closely to prescribed fairness guidelines. By 
providing support for the proposed mechanism in Armstrong’s (2013) study, the current research 
extends the literature on SDO and the factors that make certain people better suited to making 
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decisions. Specifically, these results suggest that a person’s preference for inequality between 
social groups should be taken into consideration in situations where the extent of reliance on 
affect-based moral processing may influence the decision that is being made.  
 The results of the current research also extend the literature on moral decision-making. 
The approach introduced by Conway and Gawronski (2013) to study moral inclinations proved 
useful in differentiating between people of higher and lower SDO and helped to provide a new 
interpretation of past research findings. Interestingly, in the study by Conway and Gawronski 
(2013), the researchers demonstrated that utilitarian inclinations were related to measures of 
moral identity. These results suggest that when an individual is relying on utilitarian inclinations 
in decisions, they are still driven by genuine moral concern. As there was no evidence found for 
a difference between low and high SDO individuals in utilitarian inclinations, it is suggested that 
these groups do not differ in this genuine moral concern, but differ significantly in their levels of 
affective reaction to harm.  
Implications 
 The most important real world implication of the current research is that certain 
individuals may be better suited to make decisions according to their preference for group-based 
hierarchies. When a difficult decision must be made but should involve a consideration for the 
harm that might be caused, then someone who shows a preference for equality between social 
groups should be chosen to make that decision. On the other hand, there are a number of difficult 
decisions that often have to be made without allowing emotion or affective reactions to interfere. 
One relevant example of this has been discussed, with regards to patients on an organ donation 
waiting list, in which the favourable treatment of one patient over another due to an emotional 
aversion to their suffering violates prescribed fairness guidelines. This suggests that someone 
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that demonstrates a preference for group-based hierarchies would be better suited to making this 
decision. 
 An interesting theoretical implication of this research is that it suggests that the attitudes 
that people hold may have implications in terms of their morality. This suggestion is supported 
by the correlates of SDO, such as a lack of support for the rights of minorities (e.g. gay rights, 
women’s rights, and ameliorative racial policies). Therefore, decisions being made in regards to 
social policies should not be considered as purely cognitive and related only to people’s attitudes 
and preferences, as they are additionally related to affective reactions to the suffering of these 
groups. Therefore, in addition to the implications for resource allocation decisions, these findings 
have implications for the relation between a person’s attitudes and their morality. 
 Lastly, the current research has implications for the literature on SDO. It is possible to 
question the validity of the measure of SDO due to the relatively small differences obtained in 
regards to participants’ scores. The current research indicates that small differences between 
groups at one end of the SDO scale are sufficient to uncover differences in other variables, in this 
case, moral inclinations. Though a median split in the first study revealed that the low SDO 
group and the high SDO group did not differ to a large degree in mean SDO scores, these 
differences were enough to find a significant correlation between SDO and deontological 
processing. Therefore the current study adds to the existing literature that provides evidence that 
the SDO-6 scale is useful in predicting differences on a wide range of measures (e.g. Pratto, 
Stallworth, Sidanius, & Siers, 1997). 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 There are limitations of the current research that can be addressed in future studies on 
SDO and moral decision-making. The first limitation is the lack of support for the influence of 
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the salience of harm manipulation on deontological processing. Though other studies have used 
the same materials and procedure with success (Conway & Gawronski, 2013), the current 
research did not find an effect of empathy induction on deontological processing. One possible 
explanation for this may have been the high rate of dropouts in Study 2, particularly partway 
through completion of the moral dilemmas. If participants stopped the moral dilemmas due to 
feeling emotionally aroused by the situations, then it is possible that responses were not obtained 
from those most affected by the manipulation. Another possible explanation may be due to a 
limitation of the PD approach, which involves having to exclude participants with a utilitarian 
parameter score of zero. If the participants with a utilitarian score of zero in the salience of harm 
condition demonstrated higher deontological scores than those in the control condition, then it is 
possible that the exclusion of these participants could have skewed the results. Further research 
may seek to replicate the study with a higher incentive, or recruit undergraduate students as 
opposed to having it completed online, to reduce the number of participants who fail to complete 
the study. Alternatively, future research may look to induce empathy or increase the salience of 
harm in another way. 
 There are also limitations of the current research that are inherent in the use of moral 
dilemmas. Employing moral dilemmas in research forces participants to make a number of 
“closed world assumptions” when responding (Conway & Gawronski, 2013). For example, when 
a participant must decide whether to torture a man to uncover the location of a bomb, they must 
assume that the police have the right man and that torturing him would lead to the disclosure of 
the location. In addition, participants are subject to a forced-choice paradigm, which may not 
reflect the number of choices they would have if this situation were to occur in reality. Another 
limitation of the moral dilemmas is their hypothetical and potentially artificial nature. In order to 
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effectively respond to these dilemmas, participants must actively engage in the task and respond 
as though the consequences are real. If participants are not fully engaged in the dilemma, do not 
make the proper assumptions, or do not agree with the choices given, this may force them to 
make a response to the moral dilemma that does not accurately reflect their true inclinations. In 
addition, a participant that is not engaged with the scenarios would be indifferent to the salience 
of harm, which could account for the experimental manipulation failing to influence 
deontological inclinations.  
 Though the above criticisms of moral dilemmas do have some validity, the moral 
dilemmas used in this research are created this way to avoid a number of confounds and 
extraneous variables and to find relations between variables in a controlled task. These 
limitations leave open the possibility of future research to add additional variables and make 
these situations more complex and realistic, and perhaps eventually test these variables in field 
studies. Therefore, although the situations may seem artificial, their controlled nature allows 
researchers to discover relations that build and refine our understanding of both moral processes, 
and the variables to which they relate.  
Conclusions 
 The current research has provided a new perspective on how two bodies of research are 
related. The literature on the individual difference variable of SDO has been extended, and a new 
interpretation for many past and future studies has been provided. The literature on a new 
method of conceptualizing moral inclinations has been extended, and the current results provide 
support for this method’s usefulness and applicability. By combining these two lines of research 
and relating a general attitudinal variable to different types of moral processing, these studies 
have provided a number of exciting future directions for researchers, and have important 
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implications for understanding decision-making in many high-stakes, real-life situations 
including resource allocation and the creation of social policies.  
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Figure 1. Results of regressing the deontological parameter on SDO, condition, and the 
interaction term. 
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